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"Out the Window"? Prospects for the EPA and
FMLA after Kimel v. Florida Board ofRegents
BRIAN RAY*
This note considers how the heightened scrutiny standard that the Court has
used in gender cases under the Fourteenth Amendment will impact the
congruence andproportionality test that the Court has applied in a recent series
of cases examining congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The purpose ofthis note is twofold First it closely analyzes Kimel
v. Florida Board of Regents, the Court's most recent decision concerning
Section 5 and argues that the Court's analysis in Kimel indicates that a statute
that involves heightened scrutiny has a much greater possibility ofmeeting the
standards the Court has developed under the test. Second, it examines the Equal
Pay Act (EPA) as a clear-cut example of a statute that should pass the test
because ofheightened scrutiny. Finally, this note argues that, despite its facial
neutrality, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) also implicates
heightenedscrutiny and should therefore pass the test as well. This note explains
both wey heightened scrutiny applies to the FMLA and the reasons the FMLA
shouldbe considereda valid exercise ofthe Section 5 power.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court recently took the next logical step in a trend that one
commentator has predicted will eventually send all civil rights statutes "out the
window."l In Kimel v. Florida Board ofRegents, 2 the Court ruled that Congress
lacked the authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment3 to abrogate
state sovereignty under the Eleventh Amendment when it amended the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to apply to the States.4 Although this
decision is consistent with a recent trend in the Court's interpretation ofSection 5,

* I would like to thank Professor Ruth Colker for the original inspiration for this topic as
well as helpful comments and suggestions in its development, and Professor Jim Brudney for a
thoughtful critique of the draft and the suggestions for improvement This note is dedicated to
Kim.
l See Inteiview with Professor Leon Friedman, Morning Edition (National Public Radio
broadcast, June 24, 1999) (predicting that the Supreme Court's federalism decisions will mean
that civil rights statutes are "out the window''). I was alerted to this reference in Professor Ruth
Colker's article, The Section F_ive Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REv. 653, 656 n. 14 (2000)
{discussing the Supreme Court's Section 5 decisions).
2 120 s. Ct 631 (2000).
3 Section 5 states: "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions ofthis article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
4 Kimel, 120 S. Ct at 650 (holding that the ADEA is not a valid exercise ofthe Section 5
power).
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this is the first time it has struck down portions of a civil rights statute in the
employment contexts
Kimel refined the elements ofthe "congruence and proportionality'' test that
the Court has applied in several recent cases6 for detennining the scope of
congressional power under Section 5 and opened up the possibility that the Court
may use this test to overturn other civil rights statutes.7 Although Kimel was the
first time the Court has struck down a civil rights statute, it is potentially
important that the ADEA involved a class that the Court has consistently held is
subject only to the lowest fonn of review under the Fourteenth Amendment
rational basis scrutiny.8 The Court has not yet considered a statute that involves a
higher level of scrutiny or how that higher level will impact its analysis under the
congruence and proportionality test.
This note considers how the heightened scrutiny standard that the Court has
applied in gender cases will impact the congruence and proportionality test. The
purpose ofthis note is twofold. First, it closely analyzes Kimel, the Court's most
recent decision concerning Section 5, and argues that the Court's analysis in
Kimel indicates that a statute which involves heightened scrutiny has a much
greater possibility of meeting the standards the Court has developed under the
test. Second, it examines the Equal Pay Act (EPA) as a clear-cut example of a
statute that should pass the test because of heightened scrutiny and then argues
that, despite its facial neutrality, the Family and Medical Leave Act (Fiv1LA) also
implicates heightened scrutiny and should therefore pass the test as well.
Most lower courts that have considered the FMLA have detennined it is not
valid under Section 5; however, these courts have failed to take into account the

5 See Colker, supra note 1 at 657 (stating that Kimel "is the first decision to conclude that
Congress exceeded its authority to enact legislation in the civil rights area").
6 See, e.g., Kimel, 120 S. Ct at 650 (holding that the ADEA exceeded Congress's power
under Section 5); City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that Congress did
not have the power under Section 5 to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993);
Fla Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999)
(finding that the Patent and Plant Variety Protection and Clarification Act was not within the
Section 5 power); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 691 (1999) (concluding that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act did not validly
abrogate state sovereign immunity); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (holding
that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from making the State ofFlorida capable
ofbeing sued in federal court").
7 For example, the Court will address the validity of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) under Section 5 in Garrett v. Univ. of Ala at Birmingham Bd. ofTrs., 193 F.3d 1214
(11th Cir. 1999). The Garrett decision also deals with one provision of the FMLA under
Section 5, but the Court did not grant certiorari on the FMLA issue in the case. See infra Part
V.C.2 (discussing Garrett's analysis ofthe FMLA).
8 See Kimel, 120 S. Ct at 646 (noting that age is not a suspect classification).
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effect that heightened scrutiny has on the congruence and proportionality test.9
The Court has consistently stated that Congress has the power to reach both
unconstitutional and constitutional conduct by the states when exercising its
powers under Section s.10 This indicates that the Court is willing to take a more
complex and nuanced approach to congressional exercise of Section 5 than many
lower courts have. The FMLA is an excellent test case ofthis complexity because
it challenges the limits ofthe Court's approach in unique ways. This note explains
why heightened scrutiny applies to the FMLA and the reasons the FMLA should
be considered a valid exercise ofthe Section 5 power.
Part II describes the Supreme Court's expansion of state sovereignty under
the Eleventh Amendment, particularly the development of the congruence and
proportionality test Part III analyzes the Court's reasoning in Kimel to determine
how the test was applied to the ADEA and summarizes the standards that apply
after Kimel. Part IV applies these standards to the EPA and concludes that
because heightened scrutiny applies to gender, the EPA is clearly remedial
legislation that is sufficiently circumscribed under the test Part V considers the
difficulties that the FMLA faces under these standards and develops a theoiy
based on United States v. Virginial 1 that heightened scrutiny should apply and
concludes that under the Court's accommodation requirement established in
Virginia, the FMLA is a valid exercise ofthe Section 5 power.

II. THE SUPREME COURT'S EXPANSION OF ELEVEN1H AMENDMENT
PROTECTION

The Supreme Court's recent decisions concerning the Eleventh Amendment
have shown a clear trend towards increasing state sovereignty and limiting
congressional power to subject states to suits from private individuals. This trend
9 See, e.g., Sims v. Univ. ofCincinnati, 219 F.3d 559, 566 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
FMLA is an improper exercise of congressional power under Section 5); Hale v. Mann, 219
F.3d 61, 68 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that leave for personal illness under FMLA is invalid);
Kilvitis v. County of Luzerne, 52 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408-409 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that the
FMLA's imposition of "substantive employment conditions" exceeded Congress's
enforcement powers under Section 5); Driesse v. Fla Bd. of Regents, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1328,
1332-34 (M.D. Fla 1998) (holding that Congress did not use language clearly expressing intent
to abrogate state immunity under the FMLA and that the FMLA exceeded Congress's
enforcement powers under Section 5); McGregor v. Goon!, 18 F. Supp. 2d 204, 209 (N.D.N.Y.
1998) (holding that the FMLA was not a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment); Thomson v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 574, 581 (S.D.
Ohio 1998) (holding that the FMLA exceeded Congress's enforcement powers under Section
5).
lO See, e.g., City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
455 (1976)) (stating that Congress can reach constitutional conduct by the states with legislation
under Section 5).
11 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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began with the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 12 where a five
member majority held that the state of Florida was entitled to immunity :from a
Native American tribe's suit alleging that the state had violated the federal fudian
Gaming Regulatory Act.13

A. The Seminole Tribe Standard
Seminole Tribe was significant for two reasons. First, it overruled the Court's
decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gasl4 upholding Congress's ability to abrogate
state sovereign immunity through its powers under the Commerce Clause. IS
Second, the Court articulated the standard that it will apply in determining
whether Congress has abrogated the states' sovereign immunity.16 The Court said
that it asks two questions to make this determination: (1) ''whether Congress has
unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate immunity'';l7 and (2) "whether
Congress has acted pursuant to a valid exercise ofpower."18
By overturning Union Gas, Seminole Tribe signaled a new approach to the
Eleventh Amendment and limited the potential avenues for congressional
abrogation of the states' sovereign immunity. After Seminole Tribe,
commentators speculated that two primary possibilities remained open to
Congress for abrogating sovereign immunity: (1) injunctive relief through suits
directly against state officials recognized by the Court in Ex Parte
Young;I9 and (2) abrogation under Section 5 under Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer.20
12 517U.S.44(1996).
13 Id. at 47 (holding that the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. Art I., § 8, cl. 3, does
not grantjurisdiction over a state that has not consented to be sued).
14 491 U.S. 1 (1989). The Union Gas decision is discussed in detail in Daniel J. Meltzer,
The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 S. Cr. REY. 1, 14-17 (1996).
15 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8 (''The Congress shall have the power ... [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes.").
16 Seminole Tribe, 517U.S. at55.
17 Id (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
18 Id (citing Green, 474 U.S. at68).
19 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908). Under Ex Parle Young, an individual can avoid the
problem by suing a sovereign state officer instead ofthe state itself. See id. (stating that "officers
of the state ... may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such [unconstitutional]
action"). The individual is, however, limited to injunctive relief and cannot sue for money
damages. See, e.g., Lauren Ouziel, Waiving States' Sovereign Immunityfrom Suit in Their Own
Courts: Purchased Waiver and the Clear Statement Rule, 99 COLUM. L. REY. 1584, 1588-89
(1999) (explaining that "Young and its progeny •.• are a limited recourse available only to
litigants seeking prospective relief'). For an interesting analysis of the apparent contradiction
between Seminole Tribe's curtailing of congressional power to abrogate sovereign immunity
and the Court's continued recognition of the Ex Parte Young "exception" see Laura S.
Fitzgerald, BeyondMarbury: Jurisdictional SelfDealing in Seminole Tribe, 52 VAND. L. REY.
407, 424-39 (1999).
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However, in its nexttenn, the Court limited Congress's power to abrogate via
Section 5 in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 21 where it held that Congress exceeded its
power in enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).22
Congress passed the RFRA in response to the Court's ruling in an earlier case,
Employment Division v. Smith,23 that a state does not have to show a compelling
interest to justify laws that incidentally burden the free exercise ofreligion.24 The
RFRA directly overturned this decision by requiring state and local governments
to show a compelling interest under these circumstances.25
Boerne held that Congress's power under Section 5 is primarily "remedial"
and that the RFRA exceeded this power when it attempted to legislatively change
the standard of review. The Court said that the RFRA's requirements went well
beyond the remedial power of Section 5 and noted that "[t]he design of the
Amendment and the text of section 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that
Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's
restrictions on the States."26 This was a clarification of the second prong of the
standard articulated in Seminole Tribe and represented a further narrowing of
what powers the Court will consider a valid exercise under it.27

B. The Congruence and Proportionality Test
Boerne is also important because the Court for the first time fully articulated
the congruence and proportionality test that it has continued to apply in recent
Section 5 cases.28 The Court said that "[w]hile preventive rules are sometimes
appropriate remedial measures, there must be a congruence between the means
used and the ends to be achieved."29 The Court then examined two aspects ofthe
20 427 U.S. 445 (1976). For a discussion of this narrowing trend see Leading Cases, 113
HARV. L. REv. 200, 223 (1999) (citing Nonnan Redlich & David R. Lurie, Federalism: A
Surrogate for What Really Matters, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1273, 1291 (1997)). See generally,
Colker, supra note 1 at7.
21 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
22 Id. at 536 (holding that the RFRA is ''beyond congressional authority").
23 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
24 Id. at 884-885.
25 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(aX4) (1994) (announcing in its Congressional findings that "in
Employment Division v. Smith ..• the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that
the governmentjustify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion");
see also Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb).
26 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
27 The second prong of the Seminole Tribe test examines whether Congress acted
''pursuant to a valid exercise ofpower." See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
2 8 See supra note 6.
29 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308
(1966)).
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RFRA to detennine if it passed the test. First, the Court examined the legislative
record of the RFRA and found that Congress had failed to identify any
unconstitutional behavior by the states and instead ''the emphasis ofthe hearings
was on laws of general applicability which place incidental burdens on
religion."30
Second, the Court focused on the disproportionality of the RFRA to any
potential constitutional violations by the states.31 This proportionality analysis
contained three distinct strains. First, the Court discussed the "reach and scope" of
the RFRA's provisions and detennined that its "[s]weeping coverage ensures
intrusion at eveiy level of government."32 Next, the Court identified the possible
unconstitutional conduct that the RFRA was designed to prevent and said that
"[t]he substantial costs RFRA exacts ... far exceed any pattern or practice of
unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in
Smith."33 Finally, the Court noted that the RFRA attempted to change the legal
standard that the Court applies.34 All three of these aspects contributed to the
Court's holding that the Act exceeded Congress's remedial powers under Section
5.35

For both sides of this analysis, the Court cited to South Carolina v.
Katzenbach as a comparison of a problem where Congress had the power to
subject the states to money-damages suits from private parties.36 With respect to
the legislative histoiy of RFRA, the Court said that "[i]n contrast to the record
which confronted Congress and the judiciaiy in the voting rights cases, RFRA's
legislative record lacks examples of modem instances of generally applicable
laws passed because of religious bigotiy."37 Concerning the scope of the
legislation, the Court noted that "[i]n South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the
challenged provisions were confined to those regions ofthe countiy where voting
discrimination had been most flagrant ... and affected a discrete class of state
laws, i.e., state voting laws."38 Although the Court did not rely on the lack of
30Id.
31 See id. at 532-36 (discussing the extensive ''reach and scope" ofthe RFRA).
32 Id. at 532.
33 Id. at 534.
34 See id. at 535 (''In addition, the Act imposes in evety case a least restrictive means
requirement-a requirement that was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported
to codify-which also indicates that the legislation is broader than is appropriate ifthe goal is to
prevent and remedy constitutional violations.").
35 Id. at 536.
36 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Katzenbach dealt with congressional power under Section 2 ofthe
Fifteenth Amendment which contains language similar to Section 5: "The Congress shall have
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
37 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
38 Id. at 532-33 (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315). The Court was careful to qualify
this comparison later noting that "[t]his is not to say, of course, that § 5 legislation requires
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limitations in the RFRA for its decision, this is a clear indication that it is willing
to consider the scope of a statute's measures in assessing the proportionality
aspect ofthe congruence and proportionality test.

C. Application ofthe Test in Other Cases
The Court recently applied the congruence and proportionality test again in
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board.39 The Court in College Savings Bank held that Congress was unable to
abrogate state immunity from patent infringement suits under Section 5. The
Court's application ofthe test was straightforward because it detennined that the
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act did not address any property interest
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.40 This
precluded the need for determining whether the scope of the law was in
proportion to the problem identified by Congress because there was no
constitutional right that the law could possibly be enforcing.41
The Court further narrowed the scope of the Section 5 power in the
companion case, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank,42 where it held that Congress exceeded its authority when
it subjected states to claims for patent infringement. The Court focused particular
attention on the legislative history of the statute and found that Congress had
"enacted this legislation in response to a handful of instances of state patent
infringement that do not necessarily violate the Constitution."43 The Court
tennination dates, geographic restrictions, or egregious predicates." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533.
However, the Court emphasized that "limitations ofthis kind tend to ensure Congress's means
are appropriate to ends legitimate under§ 5." Id.
39 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
40 See id. at 675 (''Finding that there is no deprivation of property at issue here, we need
not pursue the follow-on question that City of Boerne would otherwise require us to
resolve .. .'').
41 See id College Savings Bank illustrates another aspect of the Court's interpretation of
the ''remedial" requirement ofSection 5. In order to be remedial, the law must initially be aimed
at some relatively direct violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 527 U.S. 627, 638-39, 119
S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1999). In College Savings Bank, the law purported to protect property rights;
however, the Court determined that the actions that it prohibited did not meet the constitutional
definition and therefore that the law was necessarily not remedial. Id. By contrast, in Boerne,
there was no difficulty with the right that the law aimed to protect Free exercise of religion is
clearly a liberty interest Rather, the law was not ''remedial" in the first instance because
Congress was attempting to effect a "substantive" change in the nature ofthe right protected by
legislatively dictating the level ofscrutiny the Court had indicated it would apply. Furthermore,
the scope of its protection was well out of proportion to the potential unconstitutional conduct
that it was designed to address.
42 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
43 Id. at 645-46 (referring to the Patent and Plant Variety Protection and Clarification
Act).
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detennined that, due to this lack in the legislative record, the statute was out of
proportion to any remedial or preventive objective.44
This is the first time that the Court relied heavily on the legislative record to
invalidate an act, and its treatment ofthe legislative record sets a high bar for what
must be included in order for Congress to exercise its enforcement power under
Section 5. Of particular note is the Court's rejection of statements in the record
indicating that Congress intended to prevent possible unconstitutional conduct by
passing the Act. The Court dismissed testimony indicating concern over potential
future unconstitutional activity, saying, "At most, Congress heard testimony that
patent infringement by States might increase in the future ... and acted to head
off this speculative hann."45 This makes it clear that the preventive aspect of the
Section 5 power cannot be exercised unless congressional fears are grounded in
an existing trend ofunconstitutional conduct by the states.46
The Court's focus on the existence of state remedies for patent infringement
is also worth noting because it presages an aspect of the analysis that the Court
developed more fully in its most recent case, Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents.41 The Court in Florida Prepaid detennined that although patents were
clearly "property'' and therefore protected by the Due Process Clause, a state's
infringement on the patent does not necessarily violate due process: "Instead, only
where the State provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies ... could a
deprivation of property without due process result."48 The Court then took
Congress to task for only "barely consider[ing] the availability of state
remedies."49 It dismissed the testimony that Congress did consider concerning
state remedies as revealing "not that state remedies were constitutionally
inadequate, but rather that they were less convenient than federal remedies."50
The Court therefore detennined that the statute failed to address potentially
unconstitutional conduct because there is no due process problem where a state
44 See id. at 646 (noting that the provisions of the statute are out of proportion to the
problem).
45 Id. at 641 (citing House Hearings 22 (statement of Jeffiey Samuels); id. at 36-37
(statement ofRobert Merges); id. at 57 (statement ofWilliam Thompson).
46 See James Leonard, A Damaged Remedy: Disability Discrimination Claims Against
State Entities under the Americans with Disabilities Act qfter Seminole Tribe and Flores, 41
ARIZ. L. REv. 651, 682 (1999). Leonard notes that "a failure to establish remedial needs in the
legislative history may well augur against a finding that Congress has acted within Section 5,
but is probably not detenninative." Kimel appears to make the legislative history analysis a
potentially more important element than Leonard suggests because the Court continued with
this analysis despite having detennined that the ADEA could reach very little potential
unconstitutional conduct See infra Part Ill.A (discussing use oflegislative history in Kimel).
47 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
48 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643.
49 Id.
so Id. at 644.
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remedy exists. Although in this case the Court was defining the due process
standard, this consideration of existing state law implies that the Court may
constrain Congress's power to act in situations where the states have already
passed protective legislation. This is a potentially significant limitation on the
Section 5 power.

III. CONGRUENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY IN KIMEL
In Kimel v. Florida Board ofRegents, 51 the Court continued this trend of
expanding state sovereignty under the Eleventh Amendment and held that,
although Congress made its intention to abrogate the states' immunity in the
ADEA sufficiently clear, it lacked the power under Section 5 to do so.52 The
Court once again applied the congruence and proportionality test and found that,
because age classifications are only entitled to rational basis scrutiny, the ADEA
standard was out of proportion to the potential constitutional violations it was
designed to eliminate.53
This time the Court focused its attention primarily on the legislative history of
the ADEA and determined that Congress did not identify a serious problem in
state and local government sufficient to warrant the protections provided by the
ADEA. In addition, the Court took note of existing state laws prohibiting age
discrimination, an aspect it had only considered previously in connection with the
constitutional standard in Florida Prepaid.54

A. The Use ofLegislative History in Kimel
The Court's use of legislative history in Kimel is noteworthy because it alters
the analysis that was conducted in Boerne and Florida Prepaid. Unlike Boerne,
where the Court identified the substantive change in the legal standard as the
"most serious" problem,55 in Kimel it primarily relied on the lack of a strong
legislative record to invalidate the ADEA.56 This indicates a shift in the Court's
use of legislative history under the congruence and proportionality test. While it
conducted a similar examination in earlier cases, the Court did not rely on
legislative history to invalidate the RFRA or the Patent Remedy Act and
intimated that it is not the role of the Court to question the basis on which

51 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
52 See id. at 645 (concluding that the ADEA is not appropriate legislation under
Sections).
53 See id. (noting that the ADEA requirements are disproportionate).
54 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussing Florida Prepaid).
55 City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531 (1997).
56 See infra Part ID.A.I (discussing the use oflegislative history in Kimel).
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Congress makes its decisions, only whether Congress has the power to do so.57 A
comparison of the differences between the use of legislative history in each case
reveals the nature ofthis shift.
1. Comparison with Legislative History in Boerne

In Boerne, the Court examined the legislative record and determined that it
"lacks examples ofmodem instances ofgenerally applicable laws passed because
ofreligious bigotry."58 The Court noted further that this "absence of more recent
episodes stems from the fact that, as one witness testified, 'deliberate persecution
is not the usual problem in this country.'"59 The Court also characterized
Congress's main concern with respect to zoning regulations as primarily ''with the
incidental burdens imposed, not the object or purpose of the legislation."60 In
Florid Prepaid, the Court shifted its focus more directly on the gaps in the
legislative record; however, it still focused on the lack of explicit references to
state remedies rather than questioning the basis ofstatements made in the record.
While thorough and searching, these examinations accepted the evidence
compiled by Congress at face value and did not look behind it to weigh its relative
strength and reliability. The Court simply found that the evidence was insufficient
to justify the scope ofthe statutes. More importantly, the Court indicated that even
an examination this searching is unnecessary to the determination whether
Congress acted within its Section 5 power. In Boerne, the Court explained:
This lack of support in the legislative record, however, is not the RFRA's most
serious shortcoming. Judicial deference, in most cases, is based not on the state ofthe
legislative record Congress compiles but on "due regard for the decision ofthe body

57 See Boerne, 521 U.S.at531-32:
Judicial deference, in most cases, is based not on the state of the legislative record
Congress compiles but 'on due regard for the decision of the body constitutionally
appointed to decide.' As a general matter, it is for Congress to detennine the method by
which it will reach a decision.

Id (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207 (1970)). See also Note, Section 5 and the
Protection ofNonsuspect Classes after City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1542,
1549-1550 (1998). The author argues that Boerne indicates the courts will not take a close look
at legislative findings under the congruence and proportionality test. Kimefs use of legislative
histocy proves this prediction incorrect. See infra. notes 62-68 and accompanying text. See also
Leonard, supra note 46 at 682-83. Leonard also predicted that the legislative histocy analysis
would not be dispositive after Boerne.
SS Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
59 Id (quoting House Hearings 334 (statement of Douglas Laycock) and citing House
Report2).
60 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531 (citing House Report 2; Senate Report 4-5; House Hearings 64
(statement ofNadine Strossen)); id. at 117-18 (statement ofRep. Stephen Solarz); 1990 House
Hearing 14 (statement ofRep. Stephen Solarz) (citations omitted).
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constitutionally appointed to decide." ... As a general matter, it is for Congress to
determine the method by which it will reach a decision.61

The Court's examination of the ADEA's legislative record is in striking
contrast to this broad statement of deference. In Kimel, the Court not only
thoroughly examined the record, it took issue with the substantive content on
which Congress based its determinations. The Court first noted that the evidence
relied on "consists almost entirely ofisolated sentences clipped from floor debates
and legislative reports."62 This is similar to the dismissal ofthe RFRA's record as
"anecdotal evidence."63 However, in Kimel the Court went on to question the
validity of specific assertions made by individual members of Congress
concerning the ex.tent ofage discrimination in state and local government.64
The most prominent example is the Court's treatment of a statement by
Senator Lloyd Bentsen. Rather than accepting his statement that ''there is ample
evidence that age discrimination is broadly practiced in government employment"
at face value, the Court examined the content of the newspaper articles that
Senator Bentsen relied on and dismissed his assessment by noting that the articles
were "about federal employees."65
The Court then took issue with Congress's reliance on a 1966 report prepared
by the state ofCalifornia detailing age discrimination in its public agencies. It first
concluded that the report failed to indicate that the state had engaged in
unconstitutional age discrimination because ''the majority ofage limits uncovered
in the state survey applied in the law enforcement and :firefighting occupations"
that are valid even under the ADEA.66 The Court then said that "[e]ven if the
California report had uncovered a pattern of unconstitutional age discrimination
in the State's public agencies at the time, it nevertheless would have been
insufficient to support Congress's 1974 ex.tension of the ADEA to every State of
the Union."67
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that Congress could extrapolate from
the existence of a widespread problem in the private sector to find that a similar
problem existed with respect to the states. It said that this argument is "beside the
poinf' and that "it is sufficient for these cases to note that Congress failed to
identify a widespread pattern ofage discrimination by the States."68
61 Boerne, at 531-32 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 207 (opinion of Harlan,
J.)).

62 Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 649.
63 Boerne, 521 U.S. at531.
64 See infra notes 65-fJ7 and accompanying text.
65 Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 649.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. This aspect of the Court's examination of the legislative history is potentially
significant for the EPA because its legislative history is similarly Jacking in specific instances of

1766

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1755

This critical examination of the legislative record represents a significant
change from the Court's approach in Boerne and Florida Prepaid. fu those cases,
the Court simply accepted the actual findings and statements made in the record
and found them inadequate.69 By contrast, in Kimel the Court conducted its own
independent evaluation of direct assertions by members of Congress and the
sources on which they relied to determine if in fact the assertions were justified.
Although not explicit, this is clearly a repudiation of the apparent deference
that the Court expressed in Boerne and indicates that, when conducting its
analysis ofthe scope ofthe problem, the Court will look very closely at not only
what Congress purports to have found, but at the actual bases of its findings as
well.

2. Further Narrowing ofthe Section 5 Power
Furthermore, the Court's refusal to even consider the argument that Congress
could have relied on statistics showing widespread discrimination in the private
sector and assumed that a similar pattern existed for state employees indicates a
potential narrowing ofthe range ofconduct that the Court will permit Congress to
address under Section 5. fu Boerne, the Court said that it would allow Congress to
address conduct that was not in itself unconstitutional, so long as the legislation
was aimed at deterring or preventing unconstitutional conduct: "[L]egislation
which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of
Congress's enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is
not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy
previously reserved to the States."'70
Kimel reiterated that Congress's enforcement power "includes the authority
both to remedy and deter violation of rights guaranteed [under the Fourteenth
Amendment] by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that
which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text."71 However, the Court
carefully qualified this by emphasizing that the enforcement power does not
permit Congress ''to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation."72
The Court's insistence on a showing of specific documentation of
unconstitutional conduct by state employers implies a further constriction of this
potential flexibility, because it indicates that the Court will not permit Congress to

unconstitutional conduct by the states. This potential hurdle for the EPA is discussed in detail
infia Part IV.B.
69 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-32 (1997) (discussing the legislative
histozy ofthe RFRA); Fla Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
639-47, (1999) (discussing the legislative histozy ofthe Patent Remedy Act).
70 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
71 Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at644.
72/d
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infer the existence of a problem and may not even permit Congress to anticipate
the future emergence ofone.73
The strict limitations the Court appears to place on Congress in Kimel begs
the question of what sort of constitutional conduct Congress is empowered to
reach when it passes legislation to deter or prevent unconstitutional conduct by
the states, as well as the nature ofthe basis that the Court will require in order to
permit Congress this flexibility. This flexibility falls well short of changing the
legal standard that the Court has applied, but the Court has not yet indicated what
might be valid. The analysis ofthe EPA and the FMLA below argues that, at least
in the context of heightened scrutiny, the Court should be willing to allow
Congress to reach constitutional conduct when exercising the Section 5 power.74

B. A Shift in the Proportionality Calculus
On the other hand, the Court in Boerne appeared to suggest that Congress
could not act at all in an area that did not involve strong constitutional rights. The
Court stated that the more serious problem with the RFRA was its "substantive
change in constitutional protections" and appeared to imply that a detailed
legislative record could never justify this kind of statute.75 In Kimel, the Court
backed away from this by continuing with an examination of the legislative
hist01y despite an initial finding that the ADEA changed the substantive standard

73 There is a robust debate over the Court's current approach to limiting congressional
power through principles offederalism. A recent example critiquing the Court's expansion of
federalism protections is Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1304
(1999). Cross observes that federalism advocates appear ''to be congealing around ... a highly
subjective judicial balancing test with a strong procedural component that would require
Congress to justify federal involvement when legislating." See id at 1305. This appears to be an
accurate description of the approach taken in Kimel particularly the searching scrutiny of the
legislative history that the Court engaged in. An example supportive of this approach is Vicki
C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits ofLaw: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L.
REY. 2181, 2253 (1998) (arguing that courts should have the power to review congressional
action).
Although discussion ofthis debate is outside the scope ofthis note, it is interesting to note
that most courts addressing the ADEA under the Court's Section 5 analysis prior to Kimel did
not anticipate the further narrowing that Kimel represents. See Lisa M. Durham, Protection
from Age Discrimination for State Employees: Abrogation ofEleventh Amendment Sovereign
Immunity in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 33 GA. L. REY. 541, 5% (1999)
(noting that federal circuit courts have "almost unifonnly" held that the ADEA was a valid
exercise ofSection 5).
74 See infra Parts V and VI.
75 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. One commentator examining the Section 5 standard prior to
Kimel also highlighted this language as indicating that ''the issue of legislative history is
subordinate to the issue ofcongressional authority." See Leonard, supra note 46 at 682.
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for age-based classifications.76 Thus, it appears that the more searching
examination of legislative history may be a tradeoff. Rather than completely
foreclosing the possibility of congressional action when Congress acts to protect
classes that the Court has said are not entitled to heightened protection, the Court
will take a close look at the basis on which Congress is acting to see if it has in
fact identified potential constitutional violations.77
In other words, the two aspects of the congruence and proportionality test
influence one another.78 If Congress is acting to protect rights that are entitled to
strong constitutional protection, the Court will recognize that the universe of
potential constitutional violations is necessarily broader and will require
correspondingly less in the legislative record indicating that those violations exist.
On the other hand, when Congress is acting in an area where constitutional
protections are less broad, the Court will look much more closely at the legislative

76 See Kimel, 120 S. Ct at 645 (stating that "[i]nitially, the substantive requirements the
ADEA imposes on state and local governments are disproportionate to any unconstitutional
conduct that conceivably could be targeted by the Act''). See also Colker, supra note 1 at 675.
Colker argues that the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence has analyzed congressional power
differently depending on whether the constitutional right involved was based on the Due
Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. She notes that even though Kimel struck down
the ADEA, it "drew that conclusion after taking Congress's powers more seriously than it has
in recent cases involving the Due Process Clause" and therefore that Kimel indicates the Court
will be more deferential to Congress when it acts to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Id at
675-76. This deference is manifested in part by the fact that the Court will look to the
legislative record even after concluding that the Jaw appears to change the substantive standard.
See id (arguing that "[i]t is impossible to say that any federal antidiscrimination legislative
measure is not seeking to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment so Jong as Congress has created a
legitimate record"). This view is consistent with the premise of this note that Congress has
correspondingly more power to act when heightened scrutiny is implicated.
77 Professor Leonard analyzed the Court's statements in Boerne concerning legislative
histoi:y and determined that, combuied with other statements that the judicial branch has the
power to interpret the Constitution, "it would appear that no amount offact finding by Congress
could rescue an act ofCongress that the Court considers substantive." Leonard, supra note 46 at
682. Furthermore, some lower courts in analyzing other statutes under the test have noted that
examination oflegislative histoi:y is not required. See, e.g., Varner v. Ill. State Univ., 150 F.3d
706, 716 n.13 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that legislative findings are helpful for the congruence and
proportionality inquii:y; "however, they are not required"), cert. granted, 68 U.SL.W. 3458
(U.S. Jan. 18, 2000) (No. 98-1845) The Court's willingness to look at the legislative histoi:y in
Kimel after determining that there was vei:y little room for Congress to act at least appears to
open up the possibility that sufficiently detailed fact finding concerning an existing problem of
unconstitutional conduct could save a statute and perhaps even require such an examination.
78 One commentator has referred to this as the 'jelly donuf' rule. In other words, the
unconstitutional conduct is the core 'jelly'' and the conduct that Congress can reach is the outer
donut The more 'jelly'' in the middle, the bigger the donut can be. See Arlene B. Mayerson,
Comments at the Ohio State Law Journal Symposium: Facing the Challenges ofthe ADA: The
First Ten Years and Beyond (Apr. 7, 2000).
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record to determine if Congress has in fact identified the existence of
unconstitutional conduct by the states.79

C. Examination ofExisting State Law
A second difference in the approach of Kimel is the Court's consideration of
state laws that provide relief for age discrimination. The Court noted that state
employees are protected from age discrimination in "almost every State of the
Union" and emphasized that "[t]hose avenues of relief remain available today,
just as they were before this decision."80 The Court did not explicitly rely on the
existence of these protections in its analysis; however, these laws were
highlighted in the briefs for the Florida Board ofRegents.81
79 This analysis is also consistent with the approach that the Court took in early Section 5
and related cases. For example, the Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach found the Voting
Rights Act provisions prohibiting race discrimination to be a valid exercise of congressional
power without a searching analysis of the legislative record in a situation where heightened
scrutiny applied to the class of persons the law was designed to protect See Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 327.(1966). Similarly, Katzenbach v. Morgan held that the provisions ofthe Voting
Rights Act prohibiting literacy tests as voting qualifications also were valid under Section 5. See
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646 (1966). Justice Harlan's dissent in Morgan explicitly pointed out
that the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act does not contain examples of
unconstitutional conduct See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 669 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Katzenbach did, however, discuss the well-documented historical evidence of
unconstitutional conduct by the states. This opens up the possibility that, in addition to the
fonnal legislative record, the Court may also consider general knowledge concerning abuses by
the states when it considers the basis on which Congress has acted. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at
308 ("The constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act must be judged with reference to
the historical experience which it reflects."). One commentator has suggested that this
willingness to look outside the legislative record in the Voting Rights Acts cases illustrates a
more liberal approach to Section 5 than Boerne where the Court scrutinized the legislative
record fairly closely because Katzenbach and Morgan indicate a willingness by the Court to
engage in speculation about possible bases on which Congress could have acted rather than
requiring Congress to explain the basis in the legislative record. See Leonard, supra note 46 at
722-23 (saying that Morgan implies an assumption that Congress has a basis for exercising the
Section 5 power).
80 Kimel, 120 S. Ct at 650.
81 See Respondent's Briefat37, Fla Bd. ofRegents v. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000) (Nos.
98-791, 98-796), available at 1999 WL 631661. The Florida Board of Regents used the
existence of state laws to argue that not only did the ADEA fail to address existing
constitutional violations, but also that it could not be justified as an attempt to prevent potential
future violations. Their brief argued that "(n]o threat of future violations exists.... States all
have laws or administrative provisions restricting age discrimination." Id at 37. This is a more
limited use of state laws in the Section 5 analysis than I present below because it only addresses
one potential rationale that Congress could put forth for using the Section 5 power. As the
discussion below indicates, the existence of state laws could play a more direct role in
detennining both whether Congress was justified in acting to address an existing problem as
well as whether it could have been acting to prevent potential future violations.
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The Kimel Court's consideration of these laws and the prominent position
they occupied in the Florida Board of Regent's brief suggest that the Court may
have been at least influenced in its analysis under the congruence and
proportionality test by their existence. This raises the possibility that the Court
could take into account the presence or absence of state laws in a later case.82
Such an approach would be consistent with the Court's close examination of
legislative history under the test because the congruence and proportionality test is
primarily concerned with the actual extent of the problem, and the existence of
state laws directed at the same issue is strong evidence that a problem exists.
There are two ways in which the existence of such laws could be
incorporated into the test directly. On the one hand, the presence of state laws
addressing the same kind of problem as the federal legislation is evidence that the
states themselves were aware a problem existed that needed to be addressed. This
approach has the advantage of permitting Congress to act concurrently with the
states.
The other possible approach is to consider the existence of laws as evidence
that a widespread problem that requires congressional intervention does not exist
because state laws already effectively deal with the problem.83 This analysis

32 At least one circuit has already considered the existence of state laws in applying the
congruence and proportionality test. See Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1009
(8th Cir. 1999). The Eighth Circuit applied the test to the ADA and found that the Act was not a
valid exercise of the Section 5 power because it prohibited a broad range of potentially
constitutional conduct See id at 1010. Alsbrook only briefly considered the legislative histoiy
of the ADA in its analysis. In doing so, however, it noted that "all states in this circuit have
enacted comprehensive laws to combat discrimination against the disabled, many of them
adopted prior to the effective date of the ADA." Id at 1010. The context of this quotation
indicates that Alsbrook took the approach of considering state laws that existed at the time the
ADA was passed as evidence that the states were aware ofthe problem and already addressing
it and thus precluding Congress from concluding that it was necessaiy to act
83 A variation of this approach is suggested by Professor Colker's distinction between
statutes that protect rights under the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment and
those that protect rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment See
Colker, supra note I, at 677-82, 701-02. Using that distinction, it is possible to argue that the
existence of state laws should be taken into account only when Congress acts to protect rights
under the Due Process Clause. The Court in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), appears to take this approach as it relied
on the existence of state tort remedies for patent infringement in its determination that the
statute could not have remedied constitutional violations by the states. See id at 643. The Court
stated that in procedural due process claims the deprivation of a constitutionally protected
interest is not itself unconstitutional, rather ''what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such
an interest without due process of law." Id (citation omitted). The Court said that a state
remedy for the deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest creates due process, and
therefore, the existence of a state law makes the deprivation itself constitutional. See id ("Only
where the State provides no remedy ... could a deprivation of property without due process
result."). Under this analysis, congressional power under Section 5 can never be remedial under
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would require comparison of the state laws in relation to the federal approach to
determine whether the differences in coverage leave open space where Congress
could have considered action necessary.84
Although the Court apparently considered contemporary laws in Kimel, it
does not appear to have taken either ofthese approaches. Justice O'Connor noted
that anti-discrimination laws exist "in almost every State of the Union";85
however, despite their ubiquity, the Court concluded that the problem was not
widespread enough to justify the ADEA.
On the other hand, the existence of these laws does not appear to have
weighed againstthe need forthe ADEA. The Court's reference to the laws simply
emphasized that its decision would not foreclose all possible relief for state
employees. Justice O'Connor noted that "[o]ur decision today does not signal the
end ofthe line for employees who find themselves subject to age discrimination
at the hands of their state employers."86 This indicates that the Court did not
consider the laws directly in its proportionality analysis.87

D. The Standardfor Section 5 After Kimel
The discussion above illustrates that the series of cases culminating with

Kimel expanded and clarified the standards that the Court will use to determine
whether Congress has acted pursuant to its Section 5 power. Under Seminole
Tribe, the legislation must first clearly indicate that Congress intended to abrogate
state immunity and second, that the abrogation must be pursuant to a valid
the Due Process Clause in a situation where states provide their own remedy because the
existence ofthat remedy prevents that action from being unconstitutional.
84 This argument was put forth by the Florida Board of Regents in Kimel. See
Respondent's Brief at 37-38, Kimel (No. 98-791, 98-796) (noting that "states all have laws or
administrative provisions restricting age discrimination").
85 Kimel, 120 S. Ct at 650.
86 Jd
87 One interesting question that both ofthese approaches raise is the appropriate time for
considering the laws. The former approach would likely require consideration of the laws that
existed at the time that Congress enacted its legislation. Obviously, Congress would have been
aware only of laws that existed when it passed its statute, and only laws existing at that time
would provide evidence that the states considered the problem to exist.
It is also logical to consider only laws at the time of enactment from the latter approach.
Because the existence of laws from this perspective is evidence against the need for
congressional action, it would make sense to consider whether laws existed at the time of
enactment in order to assess whether Congress was addressing a real problem. Furthermore,
consideration of laws that exist at the time of the decision would create the possibility that
Congress's power to act would be subject to a gradual phasing out, depending on actions by the
state. Although this might be consistent with the Court's overall approach to the congruence
and proportionality test, which depends on conditions that are subject to change, it would be an
odd and perhaps even absurd result because Congress would have to take into consideration the
possibility offuture nullification oflegislation when it enacts laws.
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exercise of congressional power.88 Boerne reconfirmed that Congress has the
requisite power under Section 5 to abrogate state immunity when it enacts
"remedial" legislation. The Court said, however, that it will apply the congruence
and proportionality test to determine whether Congress is within the bounds of
that power.89
College Savings Bank narrowed the scope of Section 5 to rights that are
directly protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.90 Florida Prepaid added
further restrictions on the preventive aspect ofthis power and also set the bar for
legislative history relatively high. Finally, Kimel refined the congruence and
proportionality test and indicated that the Court will take a very close look at the
legislative record when conducting the analysis in a situation where the
constitutional protections are less strong.91 The following sections consider the
constitutionality ofthe EPA and the FMLA in light ofthese standards.
IV. APPLICATION TO 1HE EPA

Every U.S. Court of Appeals that has applied the Seminole Tribe intent to
abrogate and Boerne congruence and proportionality tests to the EPA has held
that the EPA is a valid exercise of the Section 5 power.92 The approach to the

88 In addition to refining the congruence and proportionality test, Kimel also appears to
have expanded the boundaries of the first prong of the Seminole Tribe test requiring a clear
statement ofcongressional intent to abrogate. The Eleventh Circuit determined that the ADEA
was unconstitutional due to lack of a clear statement by Congress that it intended to abrogate
state sovereign immunity. See Kimel v. State of Fla Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426, 1430-31
(11th Cir. 1998) (''No unequivocal expression of intent to abrogate immunity is unmistakably
clear in the ADEA."). Kimel rejected this stringent standard and found sufficient clarity in
several definition provisions which include states and public agencies. The Court said that
"(r]ead as a whole, the plain language ofthese provisions clearly demonstrates Congress' intent
to subject the States to suit for money damages at the hands of individual employees." Kimel,
120 S. 0. at 640. Because it interpreted intent from the entire statute, rather than requiring a
single explicit statement, this is arguably a more flexible standard than the Court applied in
Seminole Tribe where it articulated the test variously as requiring "a clear legislative statement''
and ''unequivocally express(ed]" intent Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1996)
(citations omitted).
89 See supra Part II.B (discussing the congruence and proportionality test).
90 See supra Part II.C (discussing application ofthe congruence and proportionality test in
these cases).
9l See supra Part III (analyzing the use ofthe test to invalidate the ADEA in Kimel).
92 See O'Sullivan v. Minnesota, 191 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that the court
'join[s] every court of appeals that has decided the issue and hold[s] Congress properly
abrogated the states' sovereign immunity when it enacted the EPA" (citing Anderson v. State
Univ. ofN.Y., 169 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3458
(U.S. Jan. 18, 2000) (No. 98-1846); Ussery v. Louisiana, 150 F.3d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1998);
Varner v. Ill. State Univ., 150 F.3d 706, 717 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 928
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congruence and proportionality test in Kimel indicates that these cases are correct
because the heightened scrutiny applied to gender should give Congress
significantly more power to act under Section 5. An analysis of the reasons the
Act is valid under Section 5 helps to illustrate the application ofthese tests in the
context of the intermediate scrutiny standard that the Court has developed for
gender. Analysis ofthe EPA also serves as a prelude to a discussion ofthe FMLA
that also arguably involves intermediate scrutiny but is a less clear case under the
congruence and proportionality test.

A. Intent to Abrogate Sovereign Immunity
Courts that have considered this question have all held that the 1974
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA}--of which the EPA is a
part93-that changed the definition of "employer" and "employee" to include
public agencies and public employees were sufficient to meet the Seminole Tribe
standard of clear intent Kimel held that the ADEA, which incorporates the FLSA
definitions, met the Seminole Tribe standard, and therefore the Court has
implicitly approved this analysis.

B. Legislative History ofthe EPA
The legislative history of the EPA is extremely detailed and documents the
widespread existence of sex discrimination in wages.94 Despite this extensive
documentation of gender discrimination, one potential difficulty with the EPA's
legislative record is that the 1974 amendments to the FLSA, which changed the
definitions to apply the provisions to the states, do not contain any specific
findings of sex discrimination in public entities.95 This is precisely the problem
(U.S. Jan. 18, 2000) (No. 98-1117); Timmerv. Mich. Dep't ofCommerce, 104 F.3d 833, 842
(6th Cir. 1997)).
93 See Varner, 150 F.3d at 709. Varner explains that the EPA, 29 U.S.C. § 206, was
passed in 1963 as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 2 U.S.C.
§ 60k. See id In 1974, Congress amended the FLSA in response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Employees v. Department ofPublic Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973), that the
FLSA did not abrogate states' immunity from suit in federal court. Id at 285.
94 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 3861 Before Subcomm. on Labor ofthe House Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 88th Cong. 13-31 (1963) (statement of Esther Peterson, Asst. Sec. ofLabor)
(presenting detailed data on economic indicators that show a disparity in pay for women across
a range ofprofessions).
95 See Varner, 150 F.3d at 714 (noting that the EPA is mentioned only once in the Senate
Report accompanying the 1974 FLSA amendments and that the legislative history indicates that
Congress focused primarily on the FLSA in the 1974 amendments (citing S. Rep. No. 93-690,
at 6, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1974); Timmer, 104 F.3d at 846 n2 (Boggs, J., dissenting) ("[t]he
items debated were primarily the minimum wage and overtime provisions."); EEOC v. Elrod,
674 F.2d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that "[l]ittle legislative history exists on the ADEA
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that Kimel identified in its analysis ofthe ADEA's legislative histmy96 as well as
one of the major problems that the Court found with respect to the RFRA in

Boeme.91
The 1963 legislative record ofthe original Act is similarly lacking in details
regarding wage scale inequities for public employees, and depending on how
much emphasis the Court puts on the need for specific identification of
unconstitutional conduct by the states, this may be troublesome for the EPA under
the congruence and proportionality test.98 Kimel expressly rejected the argument
that Congress could have extrapolated from the evidence of widespread
discrimination in the private sector when it extended the ADEA to the states in

amendment ... because the breadth and significance of the amendments to the FLSA
overshadowed the ADEA amendment)). No lower court has directly addressed this issue in
analyzing the EPA under Section 5. Instead, most have focused on the considerable examples
ofa general wage-scale differential identified in the legislative record. For example in Varner,
the court noted that the purpose ofthe EPA was to remedy a serious ''problem of employment
discrimination in private industrj' and therefore that "Congress accordingly had substantial
justification to conclude that pervasive discrimination existed ...." Varner, 150 F.3d at 716
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). This is exactly the kind of extrapolation from
discrimination in the private sector that Kimel rejected in the context ofthe ADEA. See supra
note 67 and accompanying text.
96 See Kimel v. Fla Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. at 631, 649 (2000) (stating that
examination of the legislative history confinns that Congress did not identify a pattern of age
discrimination by the states in the 1974 extension ofthe ADEA).
97 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521U.S.507, 531 (1997) (noting the "lack ofsupport in
the legislative record" for the argument that the RFRA was aimed at unconstitutional conduct
by the states).
98 The legislative history for the 1963 Act detailed the widespread existence of
discrimination in the private sector but did not address the question ofdiscrimination by public
entities. See supra note 94. However, both the extent and the nature of the private-sector
discrimination described in the EPA legislative record is different than the ADEA record, and
the Court may find this sufficient See iefra Parts IV.C.1-3 (discussing the effect ofheightened
scrutiny on the EPA and ADEA).

2000]

EPA & FMLA AFI'ER KIMEL

1775

the same 1974 amendments,99 and it is possible that the Court could reject the
EPA's extension as similarly unfounded.IOO

C. Application ofthe Congruence and Proportionality Test
It is unlikely, however, that the Court will invalidate the EPA based on the
lack ofa detailed legislative record because the EPA has a much stronger case for
proportionality than either the ADEA or RFRA, and as discussed above, the
Court has generally examined the legislative history in detail only when it first
determines that a statute is unlikely to reach potentially unconstitutional conduct
by the states.IOI
In other words, if the extent of the constitutional right involved and the
legislative history are related aspects of the congruence and proportionality
analysis, the lack ofa detailed legislative record for the EPA should be more than
offset by the fact that the EPA is dealing with a broader universe of potentially
unconstitutional conduct because heightened scrutiny applies to gender.
Comparison with the ADEA illustrates this point because it reveals that an
insufficiently detailed legislative record is fatal in the context where heightened
scrutiny does not apply.

1. The Effect ofHeightened Scrutiny

Kimel determined that the ADEA was not a valid exercise of the Section 5
power because the Court has consistently held that states could legitimately rely

99 See Kimel, 120 S. Ct at 649 (noting that the argument that Congress found substantial
age discrimination in the private sector is "beside the point''). On the other hand, the Court also
noted that it had "doubts whether the findings Congress did make with respect to the private
sector could be extrapolated to support a finding of unconstitutional age discrimination in the
public sector." Id (first emphasis added). The Court appears to be implying in this statement
that even if it were proper for Congress to extrapolate the existence ofage discrimination in the
public sector from findings of widespread age discrimination in the private sector, that would
still not provide evidence that the states were engaged in unconstitutional conduct because age
is not a suspect class. If this is the thrust of the Court's objection, then extrapolation from
private sector discrimination in the EPA context may be possible because gender discrimination
by the states would be unconstitutional.
100 Such an approach would be consistent with the Court's searching inquiry in Kimel.
However, I think that it is unlikely that the Court would go this far for two reasons. First, the
Court has repeatedly emphasized that Congress has the power both to ''remedy" and "deter''
unconstitutional conduct through Section 5. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct at 644 ("Congress' power 'to
enforce' the [Fourteenth] Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to deter
violation ofrights guaranteed thereunder ....''). Second, gaps in the legislative record are most
significant when the potential for unconstitutional conduct is minimal. See supra Part IIl.B.
IO 1 See supra Part III.B.
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on age as a proxy for other factors under rational basis scrutiny. I02 The Court said
that, therefore, the ADEA's prohibition on age discrimination would reach a
broad range of constitutional conduct by the states.I03 The Court also rejected the
argument that the exceptions provided for in the ADEA sufficiently circumscribe
the scope of the statute to meet the requirements of the congruence and
proportionality test. I04
In contrast, the EPA addresses discrimination on the basis of gender, a
category that the Court has consistently held is subject to heightened scrutiny.105
United States v. Virginia, which held that the Virginia Military Institute's (VMI)
refusal to admit women was unconstitutional, summarized the Court's "current
directions for cases ofofficial classifications based on gender'':
Focusing on the differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which relief is
sought, the reviewing court must determine whether the proffered justification is
"exceedingly persuasive." The burden ofjustification is demanding and rests entirely
on the State.... The State must show "at least that the [challenged] classification
serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives."' The
justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to
litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different
talents, capacities, or preferences ofmales and females. I06
This language emphasizes the difficult burden faced by a state when gender
discrimination is involved and highlights the relatively high potential that
classifications based on gender are unconstitutional.
Under this heightened standard, it is far more likely that the Court will find
the EPA's prohibition ofwage discrimination based on gender congruent with the
unconstitutional conduct it is designed to prevent, i.e., gender discrimination.
Unlike age, gender can never serve as a proxy for other characteristics, and a state
must always show substantial relation between its objective and the reason it is
using gender as a classification. I07

102 See Kimel, 120 S. a. at 647 (stating that "[o]ur Constitution pennits States to draw
lines on the basis ofage when they have a rational basis for doing so").
103 See id at 650 ("In light of the indiscriminate scope of the Act's substantive
requirements ... we hold that the ADEA is not a valid exercise of Congress' power under § 5
ofthe Fourteenth Amendment").
104 See id at 648 (stating that even considering the defenses pennitted by the ADEA, it
still creates astandard "akin ... to ... heightened scrutiny").
105 See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (discussing the heightened scrutiny
standard).
106 518 U.S. at 532-33 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
724 (1982); Wenglerv. Druggists Mut Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
I07 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532-33 (describing the heightened scrutiny standard).
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2. Proportional Tailoring ofthe EPA
In addition to implicating heightened scrutiny, the EPA has several

exceptions that keep it proportional to the potential unconstitutional conduct it is
designed to prevent. The Act provides four affinnative defenses to employers for
not meeting the equal pay requirement. The pay differential can be justified
"where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex ...."108
These exceptions limit the application of the EPA to situations where the pay
differential is in fact based on gender,109 and they are similar to the limitations on
the Voting Rights Act that the Court cited approvingly in Boeme.110

3. Comparison with theADEA
The situation ofthe ADEA is very similar to the EPA. The ADEA prohibits a
very specific type of discrimination in the workplace. It contains several detailed
exceptions to ensure that only unjustified conduct is prohibited, and the legislative
record lacks detailed examples of a pattern -of this discrimination by public
entities. The one difference between the two statutes is that gender is entitled to
heightened scrutiny while age is only subject to rational basis scrutiny. Therefore,
the ADEA overstepped the bounds of congressional power under Section 5
because it prohibited too broad a swath ofconstitutional conduct by the states.111

108 29

u.s.c. § 206(d)(l) (1994).

109 See Anderson v. State Univ. ofN.Y., 169 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam),
cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3458 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2000) (No. 98-1845) (holding that the four
affinnative defenses of the EPA ensure that it is ''remedial legislation reasonably tailored to
remedy intentional gender-based wage discrimination").
110 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997) (describing the geographical
and time limitations of the Voting Rights Act and noting that they ''tend to ensure Congress'
means are proportionate to ends legitimate under § 5").
ll1 See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. a. 631, 650 (2000) (holding that the
"indiscriminate scope" ofthe ADEA renders it an invalid exercise ofSection 5). Kimel appears
to be saying, in effect, that in situations where the classification used is not subject to
heightened scrutiny, Congress will have very little power, if any, to reach the states under
Section 5. One commentator has suggested that, despite these strict limitations, Congress may
still be able to reach certain forms ofintentional discrimination when rational basis applies. See
Leonard, supra note 46 at 724-27. Professor Leonard analyzes the ADA under the standard
established in Boerne for the Section 5 power and argues that the Court's application ofrational
basis to the classification of disabled restricts only the scope of congressional power under
Section 5 and does not preclude congressional action altogether. Id
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4. Scope ofthe EPA
As discussed above, the EPA is carefully targeted with several exceptions
that ensure it reaches only discrimination that is actually based on gender.112 The
one potential difficulty with the scope of the EPA is the fact that it applies a
disparate impact standard for determining when an employer has discriminated on
the basis of gender.113 Several federal courts have addressed arguments that this
standard renders the EPA an invalid exercise of the Section 5 power because it
prohibits constitutional conduct, and the vast majority have concluded that the
EPA is nevertheless valid.114
In concluding that the EPA standard is valid under Section 5, most lower
courts have cited to the Supreme Court's statement in Boerne that Congress has
the power to reach some constitutional conduct when using the Section 5 power
to remedy genuinely unconstitutional conduct.115 In its recent Section 5 decisions,
the Court has yet to hold that a statute which reaches constitutional conduct is
valid under the congruence and proportionality test. It has, however, consistently
reiterated that Section 5 does permit Congress some leeway to do so.116 The
112 See supra Part I.V.C.2 (detailing the EPA exceptions).
113 See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(l) (1994):

No employer ... shall discriminate ... between employees on the basis ofsex by paying wages
to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to
employees ofthe opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the perfonnance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions.
Id

114 See, e.g., Belch v. Bd. ofRegents ofthe Univ. Sys., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1350 (M.D.
Ga. 1998) (holding that the EPA meets the requirements ofthe congruence and proportionality
test despite the disparate impact standard); Varner v. III. State Univ., 150 F.3d 706, 717 (7th Cir.
1998), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 928 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2000) (No. 98-1117) (Congress effectively
abrogated state sovereign immunity despite the standard the EPA applies.). One lower court
considering the FMLA, however, relied on the fact that it also employed disparate impact as an
alternative ground for concluding that the Act exceeded congressional power under Section 5.
See McGregor v. Goard, 18 F. Supp. 2d 204 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that "[i]t is well
established that a claimant under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause ... must establish intentional discrimination" (internal citations omitted)).
ll5 See, e.g., Varner, 150 F.3d at 716 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518
(1997)); Anderson v. State Univ. ofN.Y., 169 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 68
U.S.L.W. 3458 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2000) (No. 98-1845) (citing Varner, 150 F.3d at 716 (citing
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518)).
l 16 See, e.g., Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533 (stating that "[w]here, however, a congressional
enactment pervasively prohibits constitutional state action in an effort to remedy or to prevent
unconstitutional state action, limitations [like those contained in the Voting Rights Act] tend to
ensure Congress' means are proportionate to ends legitimate under § 5"). This quote illustrates
the point that the Court has interpreted Section 5 to at least theoretically permit even pervasive
prohibition ofconstitutional conduct
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analysis of these courts supports the argument that the EPA is an example of
Congress reaching constitutional state action through a valid exercise of the
Section 5 power.117
Moreover, the Supreme Court has said that Title VII is a valid exercise ofthe
Section 5 power.118 In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Court held that Title VII's
authol'iz.ation of private suits against states was not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment because Title VII was an exercise of the Section 5 power.119 Title
VII also employs a disparate impact standard, and the Court's holding in
Fitzpatrick implies that this should not be a barrier to statutes passed under
Section 5.

V. APPLICATIONTOTHEFMLA
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provides an interesting test of
the Court's approach to congressional power under Section 5 because the
legislative histoiy makes it clear that Congress was attempting to address
discrimination against women in the workplace. The FMLA, therefore,
potentially implicates heightened scrutiny. Its scope, however, is much broader
than the EPA, and its approach to eliminating discrimination is more nuanced
than the strict equal treatment standard imposed by the EPA. Both of these
aspects make the FMLA more problematic under the congruence and
proportionality test The FMLA, however, also has a far more extensive
legislative record than the EPA that should strengthen its prospects under the test.

A. Intent to Abrogate
The FMLA does not contain an explicit statement abrogating state sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; however, it does appear to contain
sufficient references to state and local governments in other sections to meet the
standard in Kimel. The Act defines "employer" to include any "public agency'' as

117 The remaining question is whether the EPA is well within the scope ofthe Section 5
power or whether it represents the outer limits of what the Court will permit Congress to do
under Section 5. The limited scope of the EPA combined with the fact that it deals with a
classification subject to heightened scrutiny argue for the former interpretation. The Court's
statement in Boerne gives some weight to this interpretation because there the Court focused on
limitations in scope as a means for Congress to reach constitutional conduct by the states:
"limitations of this kind tend to ensure Congress' means are proportionate to ends legitimate
under§ 5." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533. On the other hand, the Voting Rights Act also dealt with a
class subject to heightened scrutiny, and the Court may have merely been pointing out that
limitations are still necessary in a clear-cut case such as race.
118 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 457 (1976) (holding that there is not an
Eleventh Amendment bar to private suits for sex discrimination under Title VII).
119 Id at 456 (stating that the Eleventh Amendment is limited by Section 5).
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defined in § 203(x) of Title 29.120 Section 203(x) defines "[p]ublic agency'' to
include ''the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any agency
of... a State, or political subdivision of a State."121 Additionally, the FMLA
expressly provides the right to sue for damages "against any employer (including
a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction."122
Kimel held that the ADEA's incorporation of the § 203(x) definition was
sufficient to show congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity, and
it should therefore be equally sufficient for the FMLA.123

B. The FMLA 's Legislative R~cord
The text ofthe FMLA itself contains explicit findings that "due to the nature
of roles of men and women in our society, the primaiy responsibility for family
caretaking often falls on women, and such responsibility affects the working lives
of women more than it affects the working lives of men."124 This language
indicates that Congress intended the FMLA to address gender discrimination in
the workplace, and therefore that the FMLA arguably addresses conduct
involving heightened scrutiny. The Kimel Court made it clear, however, that it is
unwilling to defer to congressional findings, and that it will examine the
legislative record closely to determine if the problem Congress purports to
address in fact exists.125

120 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
121 29 U.S.C. § 203(x) (1994).
122 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2) (1994).
123 See Kimel v. Fla Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 640 (2000). Several district courts
have found that the F.MLA did not meet the abrogation requirements. Those decisions,
however, did not take into account the less stringent standard applied in Kimel. See, e.g., Kilvitis
v. County ofLuzerne, 52 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408, 419 (M.D. Pa 1999) (holding that the FMLA's
imposition of"substantive employment conditions" exceeded Congress's enforcement powers
under Section 5); Driesse v. Fla Bd. of Regents, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1332-34 (M.D. Fla
1998) (holding that Congress did not use language clearly expressing intent to abrogate state
immunity under the FMLA and that the FMLA exceeded Congress's enforcement powers
under Section 5); McGregorv. Goord, 18 F. Supp. 2d 204, 209 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that
the FMLA was not a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 powers under Fourteenth
Amendment); Thomson v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577 (S.D. Ohio 1998)
(holding thatthe FMLA exceeded Congress's enforcement powers under Section 5).
124 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (1994).
125 See Kimel, at 648-49 (stating that examination of the ADEA's legislative history
indicates that it ''was an unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem"); see also
supra Part ill.A.I (comparing the searching examination oflegislative history in Kimel with the
statement ofdeference in Boerne).
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1. Contextualization ofthe FMLA
The legislative history ofthe flv1LA details the existence ofgender disparities
in the workforce as well as the increasing difficulties that working women face as
a result of the changing structure of the American family. The Senate Report
accompanying the 1993 version of the bill explains that the FMLA
"accommodates the important societal interest in assisting families," and then
carefully places the FMLA in the context of other employment standards that
Congress has enacted.126 This is followed by a summary explaining that the
FMLA is just another example of congressional action in response to changing
societal needs.127
In addition to emphasizing that the FMLA is primarily addressed at the
changes faced by women in the workforce,128 the Senate Report's language about
changing societal conditions addresses the concern that the Court expressed in
Kimel that Congress was using Section 5 in reaction to "a perhaps inconsequential
problem" and doing so without careful consideration ofwhether the standard was
in fact warranted by societal realities.129
By contrast, these statements indicate that Congress was extremely careful to
both detail the actual existence of the societal problem that the FMLA was
addressing and to place the FMLA in a historical context of previous
congressional action. Although it is unlikely that Congress in 1993 anticipated the
stringent standard for legislative history that the Court would create in Kimel, this
is precisely the kind of careful explication that the Court found lacking in the
legislative history ofthe ADEA.130
126 S. REP. No. 103-3 (1993).
127 See id at4-5.
128 The fact that the FMLA is primarily designed to address the challenges that these
changes have created for women is evident throughout the legislative history. See infra Part
V.B.2. This was explicitly recognized by the opponents of the bill who attempted to capitalize
on the FMLA's focus on helping working women by arguing that the bill would in fact increase
discrimination against women. See, e.g., H.R. REP, 103-8, pt 1 at 66 (1993) (Minority View on
H.R. 1). The Minority clearly indicated that the bill was primarily aimed at women and that it
believed women would be adversely affected by the FMLA:
Since working women will be viewed as the most likely candidates for parental leave, hidden
discrimination will occur ifthis bill becomes Jaw. Women of child-bearing age will be viewed
as risks, potentially disrupting operations through an untimely leave.... Unlike men, women
must still constantly prove that they can handle the responsibilities of work and family at the
same time. Ifthis legislation passes, it will only reinforce the prejudices which already exist
Id

129 See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 649 (noting that "Congress failed to identify a widespread
pattern ofage discrimination by the States").
130 Id (finding that the legislative record ''reveals that Congress had virtually no reason to
believe that state and local governments were unconstitutionally discriminating against their
employees on the basis ofage").
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2. Detailing the Challenges Faced by Working Women
In addition to contextualizing the FI\11.LA as designed to address a problem of
national scope, the legislative history also details how this shift in the nature ofthe
workforce has affected families and women in particular. In a section titled "The
New Demands on Families and Workers," the Senate Report notes that "the
General Accounting Office reports that, over the past 40 years, the female civilian
labor force has increased by about a million workers each year'' and that ''the
Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts that by the year 2005, the female labor force
participation rate will reach 66.1 percent."131
After giving several more statistics showing the dramatic increase of women
in the workforce, the report notes that the United States has experienced an
equally dramatic change in the increase of single families and that "[d]ivorce,
separation, and out-of-wedlock births have left millions of women to struggle as
single heads of households to support themselves and their children."132 The
report further observes that "[m]others' employment is often critical in keeping
their families above the poverty line."133
The numerous references to women in these statistics demonstrate that the
FMLA is intended to address the effect that these dramatic societal changes were
having on women in particular. The report specifically states that although the
loss of income due to illness has always been a problem, "such losses are felt
more today because of the dramatic rise in single heads of household who are
predominantly women workers in low-paid jobs."134 These statistics create a
substantial basis for the FI\11.LA finding that women are disproportionately
affected in their working lives by this changing societal situation.

3. Facial Neutrality ofthe FMLA
One potential objection to the argument that the FI\11.LA implicates heightened
scrutiny is that the law is facially neutral and mandates leave for both men and
women.135 This neutral provision, however, is precisely the same as other statutes
prohibiting discrimination such as the Equal Pay Act (EPA) and Title VII.
Although the legislative history ofthe EPA indicates that it is intended to remedy
a history ofpay disparity between men and women, the language ofthe statute is
gender-neutraJ.136

131 See S. REP. No.103-3 at5-7 (1993).
132 Id at6.

133 Id
134 Id at?.
135 See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(l) (1994) (providing leave for all "eligible employee[s]'').
136 See supra Part IV.B (discussing the legislative history ,ofthe EPA).
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Similarly, Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex without
reference to women even though that provision was intended to address
discrimination against women.137 The Fl\1LA, therefore, falls squarely within this
pattern and uses gender-neutral language to address the changing needs ofwomen
in the workforce confronted with increased responsibilities as a result of the
societal trends documented in the legislative history.
In addition, the legislative record indicates that Congress directly addressed
the reasons for creating a gender-neutral standard despite the fact that the Fl\1LA
primarily addressed the disproportionate effect that these societal changes were
having on women. The House Report to the 1990 version of the Act stated that
the gender-neutral provision was an "important concept in the bill" because it
prevented potential discrimination by employers against women:
A law providing special protection to women or any narrowly defined group, in
addition to being inequitable, runs the risk of causing discriminatory treatment
Employers might be less inclined to hire women or some other category of worker
provided special treatment For example, legislation addressing the needs ofpregnant
women only would give employers an economic incentive to discriminate against
women in hiring policies; legislation addressing the needs of all workers equally does
not have this effect138

C. Unconstitutional Conduct Addressed by the FMLA
The Fl\1LA's express purpose is to promote the stability and economic
security of the family "in a manner ... consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, minimizeO the potential for employment
discrimination on the basis ofsex" and to "promote the goal ofequal employment
opportunity for women and men."139 Thus, the statute is designed expressly to
prevent sex discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The initial question is whether the Court will consider this claim to warrant
the heightened scrutiny it has applied to gender cases. As the discussion of the
EPA demonstrated, heightened scrutiny creates more room for Congress to act
under Section 5 because the universe of potential unconstitutional actions by the
states is much larger.140

137See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aX1) (1994). These provisions state that it is unlawful for an
employer to "discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's race, color,
sex, or national origin." Id
138 See H.R. REP. 101-28, pt 1, at 14 (1990).
139 29 u.s.c. § 2601(bX4}-(bX5) (1994).
140 See supra Part IV.C.1 (discussing the effect of heightened scrutiny under the
congruence and proportionality test).
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As noted above, the legislative record certainly supports the assertion that,
despite the gender-neutral application of the FMLA, its primary purpose is to
address the needs of the increasing number of women in the workforce
confronted with the escalating demands that an altered family structure has
engendered.141 The critical question is whether a failure by the states to address
this changing situation for women is unconstitutional.

1. Equal Protection After United States v. Virginia
The Court's approach to gender discrimination in United States v. Virginia
where the Court held that the Virginia Military Institute's (VMI) refusal to admit
women was unconstitutional1 42 provides a basis for arguing that it is
unconstitutional for the states to fail to address the changing needs of women in
the workforce. One commentator on Virginia has analyzed the case in detail and
argues that the Court altered the equal protection analysis for gender to include a
requirement of institutional adjustment to accommodate both the biological and
social differences of women in our society.143 Kovacic-Fleischer explains that
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Virginia goes beyond what the Court had done up
until that point in gender discrimination, and her reasoning provides a basis for
extending protection to women in other aspects ofwork.144
Kovacic-Fleischer notes the Court's explicit recognition in Virginia that
"'[i]nherent differences' between men and women, we have come to appreciate,
remain cause for celebration ... " as evidence of its willingness to consider
permitting the use of difference as a basis for determining what is "equal" under
the Fourteenth Amendment.145 In addition, the Court's use of the terms
"accommodation," "adjustment," and "alteration," Kovacic-Fleischer argues,
"stresses the equal results model" because these terms require taking into account
differences between the sexes as a necessary component ofreaching equality.1 46
Kovacic-Fleischer points specifically to Virginia's recognition that VMI
would have to accommodate the biological differences of women by altering its
strength requirements and the social differences of women by altering its dorm
structure. She says that the strength accommodation in Virginia invites the
141 See supra Part V.B (discussing the legislative history ofthe FMLA).
142 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 519 (1996) (holding that VMI's admission
policy violates the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment).
143 See Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, United States v. Virginia's New Gender Equal
Protection Analysis with Ramifications for Pregnancy, Parenting, and Title VII, 50 VAND. L.
REv. 845, 867 (1997) (noting that "United States v. Virginia, however, not only requires VMI
to admit capable women, but also requires that it make institutional changes to accept them").
144 Id at 866.
145 Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 143, at 864 (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.).
146 See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 143 at 864-65 (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 545
("accommodation"); 545 n.15 ("adjustmenf'); 551 n.19 ("alteration")).
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parallel that employers should be required to accommodate pregnancyl47 and
argues that the recognition of privacy differences in Virginia between men and
women in requiring VMI to change its dorm structure supports the notion that
employers should have to accommodate the social and biological realities that
parenting is a primarily female :function.148

2. Applying Virginia to the FMLA
This analysis can be extended to the FMLA to support the argument that the
FMLA requires states to grant constitutionally mandated accommodations to
women that reflect their increased participation in the workforce and the
significant burdens that the changing family structure has created for them as a
result. The legislative history of the FMLA amply illustrates these changing
societal realities, 149 and Virginia arguably makes it unconstitutional for the states
to refuse to accommodate the biological and social differences of women in the
workforce dealing with these challenges.
The legislative history of the FMLA indicates that Congress explicitly
recognized that the Act extended protections that prior anti-discrimination
legislation in the bare equality model could not address. The House Report states
that:
As important as Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act have been, they do
not address all of the employment related problems of pregnancy and
childbirth.... Compliance with Title VII requires only that employers treat all
employees equally.... If an employer denies benefits to its work force, it is in full
compliance with anti-discrimination laws because it treats all employees equally.
Thus, while Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, has required
that benefits and protection be provided to millions ofpreviously unprotected women
wage earners, it leaves gaps which an anti-discrimination law by its nature cannot fill.
H.R. 1 is designed to fill those gaps. ISO

This statement further supports the fact that Congress was primarily
concerned with countering discrimination faced by working women.
147 Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 143 at 892. Kovacic-Fleischer notes that Virginia stated
that inherent differences between the sexes "'remain cause for celebration"' and that "[s]ex
classifications can be 'used to compensate women "for particular economic disabilities [they
have] suffered" to ''promot[e] equal employment opportunity," [and] to advance full
development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people."' Id (quoting Virginia, 518
U.S. at 533 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (per curiam); Cal. Fed. Sav.
& Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987))).
148 See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 143 at 893. (stating that "[j]ust as pregnancy can be
analogized to strength, parenting can be analogized to privacy'').
149 See supra Part V.B.
150 H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt 2, at 11 (1993).
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Furthermore, despite the explicit recognition that it extended protections beyond
the bare equality model of anti-discrimination, Congress located the need for this
extension in a nucleus of unconstitutional conduct. Prior to the above-cited
statement, the same report found that the current administration of leave benefits
for federal employees was unconstitutional:
Testifying in 1987 on the family leave available to Federal employees under current
policy, Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton, then a Professor at Georgetown Law Schoo~
found serious problems with the discretionary nature of family leave: ''We would
advise that this constitutes a systemic difference in provision of a job benefit that
makes out a prima facie case of violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act"151

As noted above, the Court has consistently stated that Congress has the power
to prohibit constitutional conduct when it passes legislation under Section 5
provided that it has identified potential or existing unconstitutional conduct that
the legislation was designed to prevent. 152 The House Report makes it clear that
Congress intended to address the unconstitutional discrimination occurring in the
provision of existing leave policies by implementing a national minimum
standard below which an employer could not fall. While this mandate may sweep
within its scope some measure of constitutional conduct, it is a limited and
legitimate response by Congress to ensure equal treatment in the workplace.
Moreover, the Court's analysis in Virginia indicates that a certain level of
accommodation is constitutionally mandated in the gender context, thus making
the FMLA even more proportional to the unconstitutional conduct it is designed
to prevent.
Both the Eleventh and the Second Circuits have left open the possibility that
this analysis is correct and that the FMLA's express purpose of preventing gender
discrimination may make it a valid exercise ofthe Section 5 power. The Eleventh
Circuit held that an individual's claim under the FMLA was invalid under the
Eleventh Amendment, but only because the plaintiff failed to show how taking
151 Id (quoting 1987 House Hearing p. 32). It is important to note that while the
unconstitutional conduct Congress identified here is not specifically among the states, it is in the
federal government sector. This creates a stronger case for pennitting Congress to find that
similar problems exist at the state level for two reasons. First, the composition ofthe workforce
is much more similar due to the similar functions and services perfonned by both federal and
state employees. Second, unlike the private sector where leave policies are influenced to a large
extent by the demands of the market, both federal and state government leave policies are
insulated to a large extent from those pressures. Accordingly, while extrapolation from private
sector discrimination to public sector discrimination may be impennissible, a similar
extrapolation from federal to state employers is not This, combined with the increased
flexibility Congress has under heightened scrutiny, create a far stronger case for the FMLA than
theADEA.
152 See supra note 10.

2000]

EPA & FMLA AFTER KIMEL

1787

leave to care for herself was connected to the purpose of preventing gender
discrimination in the workplace. 153 The plaintiff in Garrett sued for leave under a
provision ofthe Fiv1LA that permits an employee to take leave to care for her own
serious health condition.154
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the plaintiff relied on the fact that the
FMLA's purposes were to "prevent gender discrimination and to protect women
from employment discrimination due to issues regarding pregnancy, child care,
and caretaking offamily members"; however, the court rejected the claim that the
specific FMLA provision authorizing leave for an employee's own health
condition could have "even a faint connection to this purpose."155 Nevertheless,
the court carefully limited its holding to this specific provision because it
recognized that states "might well not be immune from certain other provisions of
the Act" presumably because of these gender-related purposes identified by the
plaintiffs.156
Moreover, the Second Circuit implicitly recognized the potential viability of
the argument that the FMLA's anti-gender discrimination purpose may be
sufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity in Hale v. Mann, l57 where it
invalidated the same individual leave provision as the Eleventh Circuit did in
Garrett. Despite holding that the provision permitting medical leave for one's
own condition failed the congruence and proportionality test, the court stated that
"[i]t is important to note that ... we only pass on the particular provisions at issue
here." 158

D. Scope ofthe FMLA Provisions
This aspect ofthe test will also be difficult for the FMLA because the statute
appears to go farther than simply remedying unconstitutional conduct in

153 See Garrett v. Univ. ofAla at Binningham Bd. ofTrs., 193 F.3d 1214, 1219-20 (11th
Cir. 1999) (holding that the FMLA claim for leave to care for oneself was invalid under the
second prong of Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), because Congress failed to detail
unconstitutional conduct by the states relating to personal leave).
154 See id at 1219 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (pennitting an employee to take the
leave for their own serious health condition)).
155 193 F.3d at 1220.
156 Id at 1216.
157 219 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2000).
158 Id. at 69. There are a number offederal court decisions addressing the viability ofthe
FMLA after Kimel. Another court, in Sims v. University ofCincinnati, 2000 WL 973501 (6th
Cir. July 17, 2000), held that the entire FMLA failed the congruence and proportionality test.
See Sims, 2000 WL 973501 at 5. Sims failed to fully consider the broader reach that Congress
has under Section 5 when it is addressing issues such as gender discrimination and also
discounted the extensive legislative record compiled by Congress indicating that gender
discrimination was the primacy focus ofthe FMLA. See Sims, 2000 WL 973501 at 5--6.
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mandating twelve weeks of leave per year.159 The majority of lower courts that
have considered the F.MLA have found that it fails the congruence and
proportionality test for precisely this reason.160

I. Increased Flexibility under Heightened Scrntiny
These lower court cases do not, however, focus on the increased flexibility
that the possibility of heightened scrutiny creates under the test, particularly the
accommodation requirement in Virginia. The accommodation requirement
established in Virginia arguably requires that states provide sufficient leave to
women in recognition of the social and biological reality that women are the
primruy caregivers in our society. In fact, the legislative history of the F.MLA
expressly recognizes this reality and lends support to this conclusion.161 Under
this analysis, the F.MLA's leave requirement does not exceed the Section 5 power
because it simply remedies the situation in which women are not granted the
constitutionally required accommodations. •
The obvious difficulty with extending the Virginia accommodation
requirement to the F.MLA is the fact that in Virginia the Court simply required the
state to extend to women a service that it provided exclusively to men and
recognized that doing so would require accommodation of the very real
differences between men and women. The F.MLA, however, mandates that states
provide a benefit to both men and women that they may or may not have been
providing already. In other words, whereas Virginia required the state to make
accommodations as a necessruy part of remedying its unconstitutional conduct,
the F.MLA arguably requires something more because it affinnatively imposes a
requirement on the states.

159 See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(l) (1994) (requiring twelve weeks of unpaid leave per year
for eligible employees).
160 See Kilvitis v. County of Luzerne, 52 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408, 419 (M.D. Pa 1999)
(holding that the FMLA's imposition of "substantive employment conditions" exceeded
Congress's enforcement powers under Section 5); Driesse v. Fla Bd. of Regents, 26 F. Supp.
2d 1328, 1332-34 (M.D. Fla 1998) (holding that Congress did not use language clearly
expressing intent to abrogate state immunity under the FMLA and that the FMLA exceeded
Congress's enforcement powers under Section 5); McGregor v. Goord, 18 F. Supp. 2d 204, 209
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that the FMLA was not a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5
powers); Thomson v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 5 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577 (S.D. Ohio 1998)
(holding that the FMLA exceeded Congress's enforcement powers under Section 5). One court
that found the FMLA valid rested on the bare fact that Congress expressly invoked both the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 as alternative bases for passing the FMLA. See, e.g.,
Biddlecome v. Univ. ofTexas, 1997 WL 124220, at *3 (S.D. Tex.) (holding that the FMLA is
valid because Congress expressly invoked Section 5).
161 See supra Part V.B (discussing the legislative history ofthe FMLA).
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The EPA is based on a straightforward anti-discrimination model under
which discrimination is equated with difference in treatment.162 Under this
model, the central requirement is essentially a negative one: an employer is
prohibited from paying different wages for the same job on the basis of gender. In
contrast, the FMLA creates an affirmative requirement: employers must provide
twelve weeks of leave to qualified employees. This leave requirement is
qualitatively different from the prohibition ofthe EPA.163
This may not be fatal to the FMLA, however, because it is possible to
conceive ofthe FMLA as simply remedying an existing constitutional problem in
the way that states treat their employees by recognizing the social and biological
differences of women. Under this reasoning, the fact that a state employs
individuals means that it cannot discriminate on the basis of gender in doing so.
After Virginia, non-discrimination includes accommodating the differences
between men and women in the workforce. The FMLA enforces this
accommodation requirement by mandating that states provide leave in
recognition of the role of primary caregiver played by women in American
society.
This model of non-discrimination recognizes that equal treatment is more
complex than bare equality in work requirements and benefits. The Court's
recognition of the inherent differences between men and women on both the
biological and social level appears to be a development in this direction because it
mandated that VMI take those differences into account as a necessary element of
opening up that educational opportunity to women.164
162 For a discussion of the historical background and use of this model see Samuel
Issacharoffand Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the Demands
ofPregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2154, 2159 (1994) (describing the "$.59" slogan used by
women's rights advocates in the 1970s as illustrative of the rationale behind this model).
Issacharoff and Rosenblum note that the anti-discrimination model has historically
predominated in the United States courts. By contrast, in Europe it is common for statutes to
affirmatively accommodate the differing demands on men and women in the workplace. See id
at 2158. See also Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 143, at 854-856. Kovacic-Fleischer refers to
this model as "equal results" and says that under it "equal treatment in the face of these
differences [between men and women] produces unequal results." Id at 854.
163 See Kovacic-Fleischer supra note 143, at 2189 (describing the FMLA as "[a]n
alternative statutory model that seeks to provide actual benefits rather than simply to prohibit
discrimination").
164 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). The Court first notes that
"'[i]nherent differences' between men and women ... remain cause for celebration" and further
that "[s]ex classifications may be used to compensate women 'for particular economic
disabilities [they have] suffered ...."' Id (alteration in original) (quoting Califano v. Webster,
430 U.S. 313, 320) (1977)) (per curium). This is an explicit recognition that statutes recognizing
the different demands placed on women and men in the workforce can be constitutional. This
note's premise takes this conclusion to the next logical step and argues that not only are
differences potentially constitutional, failure to take them into account can be unconstitutional
because it denies real equality ofopportunity.
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2. Constitutionality ofthe Twelve-Week Requirement
· One further potential objection to the FMLA is that the requirement oftwelve
weeks of leave per year has no constitutional basis. The Court's
acknowledgement in Kimel and other cases that Congress can prohibit certain
constitutional conduct when it enacts remedial legislation under Section 5,
however, gives Congress some flexibility in detennining the appropriate remedy
for discriminatory conduct.165 This recognition by the Court involves a certain
amount of deference to Congress as the appropriate body for detennining the
precise contours of the legislation necessary to remedy unconstitutional conduct
by the states.166 The twelve-week requirement is an excellent example of a
situation where Congress, with its ability to engage in detailed fact-finding
concerning the scope and nature of a problem, should be able to mandate a
standard that does not have a direct constitutional basis.
The legislative history of the FMLA provides further support for the
constitutionality of the twelve-week requirement because it shows that Congress
reduced the leave requirement from a high of eighteen weeks in response to
concerns that it was imposing too great a burden on employers.167 The record
indicates that Congress balanced the time necessary for parental bonding against
the hardship on employers in order to reach this figure.168 This reduction to the
minimum necessary time is the kind ofcareful limitation that the Court in Boerne
said that it would look for when analyzing whether congressional action is within
the bounds of the Section 5 power even when it prohibits some constitutional
conduct.169
Furthennore, Congress based the twelve weeks to some extent on empirical
evidence that this period is the minimum necessary for adequate parent-child

165 See City ofBoemev. Flores, 521U.S.507, 518 (1997) ("Constitutional violations can
fall within the sweep ofCongress [sic] enforcement power.'').
166 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 502-503 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)
(stating that Congress's "special attribute as a legislative body lies in its broader mission to
investigate and consider all facts and opinions that may be relevant to the resolution of an
issue").
167 See H.R. REP. 101-28, pt. 1, at 22 (1990). This report notes that the original bill
required eighteen weeks of leave and that the reduction represented a "compromise"
specifically between the amount of time necessruy for parental bonding and the burden on
employers providing the leave. In this version ofthe bill the leave was reduced to a low often
weeks. The final version added back an additional two weeks for a total oftwelve weeks.
168 See id
l69 See Boerne, 520 U.S. at 533 ("Where, however, a congressional enactment
pervasively prohibits constitutional state action in an effort to remedy or to prevent
unconstitutional state action, limitations of this kind tend to ensure Congress' means are
proportionate to ends legitimate under§ 5.'').
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bonding both with a newborn and after the adoption of a child.170 It is interesting
to note that one objection raised by opponents of the FMLA was that twelve
weeks was insufficient to accomplish the goal of bonding.171 However,
proponents of the bill argued that twelve weeks created the correct balance
between permitting the minimum time necessary for bonding without placing too
heavy a burden on employers. 172 This provides further support for the argument
that Congress deliberately limited the scope ofthe FMLA in order to require only
the minimum time necessary for remedying the hurdles faced by women in the
workplace.173
VI. CONCLUSION: STILL INSIDE

Despite Professor Friedman's dire prediction, the Court's decision in Kimel
does not mean that all civil rights statutes will soon be "out the window."174
Although K.imel's analysis ofcongressional power under Section 5 shows that the
Court will look closely at the basis on which Congress purports to act, it also
indicates continued acknowledgment that Congress has significant power under
Section 5 provided it carefully documents the need for remedial action.
Furthermore, Kimel implies that the Court will require correspondingly less of
Congress when it acts in an area ofstrong constitutional rights.
The heightened scrutiny standard that the Court applies to gender clearly
indicates that Congress should have broad powers to act under Section 5 when it
is addressing gender discrimination. The Equal Pay Act (EPA) is a clear example
170 See H.R. REP. 101-28, pt 1, at 22 (1990). The report cites testimony that indicated the
minimum necessary for bonding ranging from a high of four months to a low of six to eight
weeks. The twelve-week requirement thus appears to be a compromise. See also 139 CONG.
REc. H389 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Owens) (noting that the initial bill
provided eighteen weeks offamily leave and twenty-six weeks ofdisability leave).
171 See 139 CONG. REc. Sl006-07 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1993) (statement by Sen. Hatch)
(stating that the FMLA ''fails to provide sufficient time for the bonding process between parent
and child").
172 See supra note 65 (discussing the "compromise" that the requirement represents).
173 Opponents of the FMLA also argued that twelve weeks was not related to the Act's
goal of providing leave to care for ill children or relatives noting that serious illnesses are not
unifonnly limited in time. See 139 CONG. REc. Sl007 (stating that "it is ... obvious that many
serious illnesses do not confine themselves to 12 weeks''). This argument is further evidence
that Congress was primarily concerned with offsetting the unique challenges faced by women
in the workplace because the twelve weeks was linked primarily to the time necessary for
bonding which is a role primarily played by women. While caregiving generally including for
ill relatives also falls disproportionally on women in United States society, it is not linked
biologically in the same way that childbirth and the subsequent bonding process. As noted
above, the compromise oftwelve weeks was also primarily dictated by the time necessary for
bonding. See supra note 165.
174 See supra note 1.
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of where Congress is well within its powers under Section 5 because that Act
directly remedies gender-based pay disparities using a straightforward equality
model of non-discrimination. Moreover, the EPA is carefully limited in scope to
ensure it reaches only pay differences that are actually based on gender.
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) is also aimed at remedying
disparities affecting women in the workforce. In particular, it is designed to
alleviate the disproportionate burden that working women bear as the traditional
caregivers in American society. The increasing numbers of women in the
workforce, especially the large number ofwomen who are single-parent heads-of
households, are at a distinct disadvantage in their working lives because of this
traditional role. The Court's decision in Virginia provides a basis for Congress to
act not only to remedy the kind of bare inequality represented by pay disparities,
but also to take into account the more subtle disadvantages that social and
biological factors create for working women. The FMLA does exactly that by
requiring states to provide leave that is directly linked to the core care-giving
functions traditionally played by women.
The Court will almost certainly continue to look closely at civil rights statutes
based on the Section 5 power.175 Although its recent Section 5 decisions reveal a
clear narrowing trend, the Court has yet to decide a case dealing with heightened
scrutiny. Both the EPA and the FMLA illustrate the increased flexibility that
Congress should have to address problems where heightened scrutiny is
implicated.

175 See supra note 7 (discussing one ADA case scheduled for the 2000--2001 tenn).
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